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Summary: This study investigated the deception detection abilities of teenage 
offenders and teenage non-offenders who made veracity judgments about 12 videotaped 
interviewees, and also explored the behavioural characteristics of teenage liars and truth 
tellers. The findings revealed that teenage offenders were significantly more accurate in their 
credibility judgments than teenage non-offenders. However, the offenders’ impressive 
accuracy rates were not as a consequence of using valid cues to deceit. The feedback 
hypothesis helps to explain why the offenders were more accurate in their decisions: 
Operating within a criminal environment may mean that teenage offenders frequently lie and 
are lied to. Consequently, they receive more feedback than non-offenders regarding the 
effectiveness of their lies as well as how successful they are at detecting lies. As a result, their 
lie detection ability improves. The current study suggests moving away from individual 
deceptive cues as predictors of deceit towards a more intuitive and holistic approach to lie 












Teenage Offenders’ Ability to Detect Deception in Their Peers 
Research has shown that perceived experts in the field of lie detection often perform 
no better than lay individuals when detecting deceit (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & 
O’Sullivan, 1991; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Vrij, 2008).  In contrast, studies suggest that adult 
incarcerated criminals exhibit better lie detection skills than experts and lay people (e.g. 
Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Andersson, 2004).   
Additionally, criminals are more likely, than non-criminals, to hold beliefs about cues 
to deceit that more accurately mirror valid cues to deceit (Granhag, Andersson, Stromwall & 
Hartwig, 2004; Vrij & Semin, 1996). There is an abundance of literature available on the 
deceptive cues (both nonverbal and verbal) associated with lying and the detection of lies in 
adulthood.  However, research in this area with teenage participants is underrepresented. This 
is particularly true of the abilities of teenage offenders to detect deception. The current study 
is the first to look at both the behavioural cues exhibited by teenagers who are lying and 
telling the truth and the ability of teenage offenders to detect deception in their peers. To do 
this, we recruited teenage offenders, living within the community, in an attempt to establish 
whether their deception detection ability develops through their teenage years and prior to 
custodial incarceration.  
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Deception detection accuracy: Offenders vs. non-offenders 
 Human performance at detecting deceit rarely exceeds 60% (Vrij, 2008). In 
comparison studies, offenders have shown significantly higher accuracy scores 
(approximately 65.4%) than non-offenders who achieve an accuracy rate of no better than 
chance level (50%) (Hartwig et al., 2004). Hogarth (2001) proposed that mere experience of a 
task (e.g., having to detect lies frequently) is not enough to improve performance. Instead, 
relevant outcome feedback must also be present to improve individual accuracy. Lie 
detection feedback may act as a catalyst for offenders, who are more likely to exhibit and 
face deceptive behaviour (DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986). For example, offenders, unlike non-
offenders, are likely to receive feedback about whether or not their deceptive strategies are 
effective. If they are effective, they will avoid being caught by the authorities and they will be 
able to successfully commit criminal acts involving fraud and deceit.  If they are not effective 
in their deception strategies they will be more likely to be caught and less likely to 
successfully undertake their criminal activity.  Criminals may also develop self-preservation 
strategies through feedback from repetitive interrogations (Hartwig et al., 2004). Offenders 
are therefore seen to have more insight into the psychology of deception (Granhag et al., 
2004). The facilitative aspect of feedback appears important in developing deception 
detection ability. Simply making judgments about veracity does not increase lie detection 
accuracy (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). It is the feedback of knowing if those judgments were 
accurate that can act as a mechanism for increased lie detection accuracy. Suggestions have 
been made that the feedback criminals receive through interrogation may increase their 
particular deception strategies (Hartwig et al., 2004), allowing for a process of 
accommodation to build a successful knowledge base. It is proposed that it is this knowledge 
that increases their deception detection abilities. As such, it was predicted that teenage 
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offenders in the current study would show better deception detection ability than teenage 
non-offenders (Hypothesis 1).  
Truth and lie biases 
Research suggests that individuals are more likely to identify truthful statements than 
deceptive ones due to their predominant exposure to truthful discourse (Vrij, 2008), which is 
referred to as a ‘truth bias’. Levine, Park and McCornack (1999) were the first to identify a 
substantial truth bias in their research, with participants more likely to identify targets as 
honest instead of deceitful, a finding replicated over the intervening years (see Vrij, 2008 for 
a review).  A meta-analysis identified that, on average, individuals tend to correctly identify 
truths in 61% of cases, and lies in 47% of cases (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), which supports a 
‘veracity effect’. Elaad (2003) proposed that the environment plays a key role in adapting 
biases towards veracity for most people.  That is, individuals frequently work and socialise 
with others and so there is a requirement that, on the whole, most people take what others say 
at face value (Levine, 2014).  Should people start to question, scrutinise and doubt every 
assertion heard then cooperation and trust will break down. 
However, this truth bias may not apply to criminals who are more likely to lie in high 
stakes situations and to exhibit suspicion towards others. Such findings were found by 
Hartwig et al. (2004) when comparing the deception detection ability of prison inmates with 
college students. Although Hartwig et al. (2004) found no significant difference between the 
overall detection accuracy of students (57.7%) and prison inmates (65.4%), the identification 
of deceptive statements was particularly high for prison inmates (88.5%) compared with 
students (65.4%). Both the prison inmates and the students found it difficult to correctly 
identify truthful statements (42.3% and 50% respectively). Overall, prison inmates exhibited 
a lie bias; thus were better at identifying deceptive statements compared to truthful ones. This 
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enhanced ability to detect deceptive statements is also documented by Bond, Malloy, Arias, 
Nunn and Thompson (2005), who looked at biases in prison and non-prison contexts, with 
younger and older adults. Younger prison inmates were classified as accurate deception 
identifiers, however they were also shown to exhibit a lie bias. This suggests that their 
unusual social environment led them to develop a ‘reversed veracity effect’ (Bond et al., 
2005). In the current study, it was hypothesised that teenage non-offenders would exhibit a 
truth bias in their credibility judgments whereas teenage offenders would exhibit a lie bias in 
their credibility judgments (Hypothesis 2). 
Believed vs. actual cues to deceit 
Commonly held misconceptions about the behaviours that indicate deception can 
affect performance (Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  Such cues that lay individuals believe to be 
indicative of lying (e.g., lack of eye contact and fidgeting) are often not actual cues to deceit. 
Both believed and actual cues to deceit have been thoroughly documented and meta-analyses 
consistently reveal a mismatch between the two (e.g., Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij & Bull, 1996; 
DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). If detectors were to refer to a different set of cues, then lie 
detection ability should increase (Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  
Meta-analyses reveal very few actual nonverbal indicators of lying (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, 2008). The most reliable being an increase in voice pitch, duration of response 
latency (the time between the end of a question and the beginning of an answer) and a 
decrease in hand/arm movements and foot/leg movements (DePaulo et al., 2003, Vrij, 2008). 
In a meta-analysis by Sporer and Schwandt (2006), only two out of nine indicators were 
associated with deception in weighted analysis (voice pitch and response latency). In 
addition, the idiosyncrasy of human behaviour compounds this lack of reliable cues to deceit 
with no single behaviour exhibited every time an individual lies (Vrij, 2008).  
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Inaccurate/Invalid perceptions of lie behaviours are not only true of student populations, but 
have also been found for social workers, police officers and teachers (Stromwall & Granhag, 
2003; Vrij, Akehurst & Knight, 2006). 
Research by Forrest, Feldman and Tyler (2004) demonstrated that when participants 
were more accurate/valid in their beliefs regarding actual cues to deception, they increased 
their lie detection ability. Interestingly, Granhag et al. (2004) and Vrij and Semin (1996) 
found that criminals held more accurate/valid beliefs, in general, regarding cues to deceit and 
this is likely to contribute, along with more day-to-day feedback, to their superior lie 
detection accuracy. 
Vrij and Granhag (2012) have discussed the need for research to look more at how 
questioning can enhance the elicitation of cues to deception, rather than a passive observing 
of behavioural cues displayed during such questioning. They suggest moving away from the 
use of video clips depicting truthful and deceptive discourse. The argument of the current 
paper is that whilst this approach is of course warranted, when looking at both ‘offenders’ 
and ‘teenagers’ as a population, research should not be too hasty as to jump directly to 
process based approaches before fully appreciating the extent to which a cue based approach 
may be used within teenage detectors. 
 In the current study, certain behaviours of the interviewees were coded for frequency 
or duration to assess whether or not there were any significant differences between truth 
tellers and liars.  That is, we investigated whether or not there were any actual differences in 
behaviours that, for our sample, would be helpful in making credibility judgments. We then 
asked our participants (the teenage offenders and teenage non-offenders) which cues they 
used to make their credibility judgments.  It was hypothesised that teenage offenders would 
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be more likely than non- offenders to use accurate/valid cues to make accurate credibility 
judgments (Hypothesis 3). 
Method 
Participants   
Youth support programme co-ordinators were emailed about the study.  The co-
ordinators then invited the young people on their programmes to volunteer for this study.  
Sixteen participants (eight males, eight females) between 13 and 18 years of age (M = 15 
years, SD = 1.71 years) were recruited from the programmes to form the offender group. We 
asked the young people if they had been convicted of an offence and to list the transgressions 
for which they were convicted. Whilst a conviction was necessary for a participant to be 
categorised as an offender, most participants failed to disclose details of their offences. 
However, for those that did, offences included battery, theft, racial assault, arson, 
endangering life and criminal damage. The services managers for the youth support 
programmes consented to the teenagers participating because of the difficulty of obtaining 
parental consent.  Participants themselves also completed informed consent forms. 
A further 36 participants (12 males and 24 females) between 12 and 17 years (M = 
16.4 years, SD = 1.25 years) were recruited from a secondary school
1. Potential participants’ 
parents gave consent for their children to participate, and the children themselves also 
completed informed consent forms. 
Design 
                                                          
1
 The unequal sex ratio within the secondary school was a representation of the unequal female: male ratio 
within the classes that we were given access to.  
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The first phase of the experiment comprised of a 2 (Offender Status: offender vs. non-
offender) x 2 (Veracity: truthful vs. deceptive) independent groups design. The dependent 
variables were participants’ accuracy scores on the lie detection tasks (including accuracy for 
truths and lies separately).  
For phase two, behavioural cues exhibited by truth tellers and liars were coded from 
the video recordings of the interviews.  The behaviours that were coded were duration of 
response latency (in milliseconds), frequency of hand movements, frequency of foot 
movements and number of details included in interviewees’ accounts. These behaviours were 
selected based on published findings by Vrij (2008) whose review suggests that these cues 
are the most reliable for use by lay persons (with no training in techniques such as Criteria-
Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring). Previous meta-analyses suggest that 
response latencies are longer, frequency of hand movements and foot movements are fewer, 
and there is less detail included in the accounts of liars compared with the accounts of truth 
tellers. For interest, duration of eye contact was also coded as it was anticipated that 
participants would indicate that they had used this to judge credibility as it is often cited as a 
believed cue to deceit (Stromwall & Granhag, 2003; Vrij, Akehurst & Knight, 2006), but not 
an actual indicator of deceit (Vrij, 2008). 
Stimulus material 
All participants in the first phase of the study watched video clips of interviews with 
truth-telling and lie-telling teenagers. To create these truthful and deceptive clips, 12 young 
people who were not participants in the main study (five males and seven females, aged 14 to 
18 years) were recruited as interviewees, via opportunity sampling. Six interviewees told the 
truth in their interviews and six were instructed to lie during their interviews. All 12 
interviewees took part on the same day, within the same interview room, and were 
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interviewed by the same person who was blind to the veracity condition of the interviewees. 
Deceptive interviewees were given an MP3 player to hide on their person; truth tellers were 
not. All interviewees were told that they would be questioned about the whereabouts of the 
MP3 player that had gone missing in the canteen earlier that day and instructed to deny the 
possession of the MP3 player. Therefore, truth tellers just had to tell the truth (because they 
did not have the MP3 player), whereas liars had to lie (because they were in possession of the 
MP3 player). A video camera recorded the interviews with a full-length shot of the 
interviewee; thus all of the body and facial movements of the interviewees were visible on 
screen. The interviewer was not in the shot, but could be heard. The interviewer interviewed 
each young person in turn asking about the whereabouts of the MP3 player using eight 
standardised questions (see Appendix 1). Interviewees were then debriefed.  The video clips 
of truthful interviewees ranged from 65 seconds to 83 seconds (M = 74.83 seconds) and the 
six clips of interviewees who were lying ranged from 78 seconds to 90 seconds (M= 79.25 
seconds).  
Procedure 
Participants were each given an answer booklet and informed that they would see a 
number of interview clips, regarding the whereabouts of a stolen MP3 player. They were told 
that some individuals in the clips were hiding an MP3 player on their person and others were 
not. They were then informed that after each clip they would need to make a veracity 
judgment, indicating whether they believed the individual or not. It was stressed that there 
could be any combination of truths and lies (i.e., 100% truths or 100% lies or any 
combination of the two). This allowed for unbiased judgments based on participants’ beliefs 
about the clips, rather than decisions based on how many truthful and deceptive clips there 
were thought to be.  Furthermore, to manage expectations, participants were told that they 
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would see 18 interview clips when they were actually only shown 12 clips. This was to 
reduce the likelihood that participants would guess there was a 50:50 ratio of lies to truths 
and adjust their judgments accordingly.  As well as indicating whether they believed each 
interviewee to be lying or telling the truth, participants were also asked to indicate the verbal 
and nonverbal cues they used to help them make each veracity decision; participants were 
able to give open text responses with no structuring from the researchers.  
The 12 interview clips were shown to participants via a laptop computer.  Four DVDs 
were used for this experiment with each DVD presenting the 12 clips in a different sequence. 
Each DVD was shown an equal number of times. This methodology was used to reduce order 
and fatigue effects. 
 When participants had rated all 12 interview clips, they completed a questionnaire 
which was comprised of 14 questions relating to gender, age, any previous participation in 
psychology experiments and any previous offences that they had committed (number of times 
charged with an offence and number of times convicted).  
Coding behavioural cues 
A software system called Interact was used to code duration of response latency (time 
in ms from end of question to beginning of answer which was summed across each 
interview), frequency of hand movements, frequency of foot movements, quantity of detail (a 
score of 1 given to each piece of new information given) and duration of eye contact (time in 
ms summed across each interview) for truth tellers and liars.  Two evaluators coded each of 
these five behaviours. Inter-rater reliability, calculated using Pearson’s correlations, was very 
high for all behaviours:  Duration of response latency in ms (summed across each interview), 
r = .925, p < .001; frequency of hand movements, r  = .995, p < .001; frequency of foot 
movements, r  = .992, p < .001; number of details provided, r = .955, p < .001; duration of 
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eye contact in ms (summed across each interview), r  = .985, p < .001. The mean ratings 
across the two evaluators were used for subsequent analyses. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
It was not assumed that those participants recruited via the youth offending 
programme were offenders and that those recruited via the school were non-offenders.  This 
was verified by examining all responses to the questions asked about previous criminal 
records.  All 16 of the participants labelled young offenders indicated on their questionnaires 
that they had been charged and convicted of at least one crime.  None of the 36 young non-
offenders indicated that they had been charged or convicted of a crime2.  
Accuracy rates 
To allow results to be compared with those of similar studies, percentage accuracy 
was computed for each group. Offenders, with 67% accuracy, performed significantly better 
than chance, binomial p < .001 whereas the non-offenders, with 50% accuracy did not 
perform significantly better than chance, binomial p = .68. When looking at accuracy by 
veracity of statement, offenders correctly identified 60% of truthful statements and 73% of 
lies. Both these accuracy rates were significantly above chance level  (binomial p = .01 and 
binomial p < .001 respectively). Non-offenders identified 49% of truthful statements and 
51% of lies.  Neither of these accuracy rates were significantly different from chance level 
(binomial p = .65 and binomial p = .95 respectively).  
                                                          
2
 Although our categorisation of offenders was via self-report, it is unlikely that the participants recruited via the 
school were neglecting to report any convictions as it was stressed to them that the information they gave could 
not be linked to them in any way. 
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 To test Hypothesis 1, a one-way MANOVA was calculated with Offender Status 
(offender vs. non-offender) as the independent variable and overall accuracy (number of 
correct decisions out of 12), accuracy for lie clips (number of correct decisions out of six) 
and accuracy for truth clips (number of correct decisions out of six) as the dependent 
variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect for Offender Status, 
F (2, 49) =12.078, p = < .001, eta² =.953. Additionally, significant univariate main effects for 
Offender Status were obtained. Overall, young offenders were significantly more accurate (M 
= 8.00, SD = 1.51, 95% CI [7.20, 8.98] than young non-offenders (M = 6.00, SD = 1.62, 95% 
CI [5.47, 6.53]), F (1, 50) = 17.58, p = < .001, d = 1.28. For the lie clips, young offenders 
were significantly more accurate (M = 4.38, SD = 0.72, 95% CI [3.90, 4.86]) than young non-
offenders (M = 3.08, SD = 1.05, 95% CI [2.76, 3.41]), F (1, 50) = 17.58, p = < .001, d = 
1.44. Finally, for the truthful clips, young offenders were more accurate (M = 3.63, SD = 
1.50, 95% CI [2.94, 4.31]) than young non-offenders (M = 2.92, SD = 1.28, 95% CI [4.46, 
3.37]), but this was not significant, F (1, 50) = 3.00, p = .089.  
Signal detection analysis  
Meissner and Kassin (2002) have suggested that Signal Detection Theory (SDT) can 
be used to analyse the accuracy of credibility assessments. As such, the performance of our 
evaluators was calculated in terms of discrimination accuracy (d’) and response bias (β). D 
prime (d’) is a pure measure of sensitivity; it measures the signal and the noise means in 
standard deviation units. It corrects for response bias and guessing. A value of 0 indicates 
evaluators showed an inability to distinguish liars from truth tellers. Values above 0 indicate 
an ability to distinguish liars from truth tellers, and negative values indicate response 
confusion (i.e., sampling error, such as providing a ‘true’ response when you actually 
intended to provide a ‘lie’ response, or vice versa (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999)). Beta (β) is a 
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measure of response bias (i.e., the tendency to respond ‘truth’ or ‘lie’). A value of 1 means 
participants did not favour a particular response, a value greater than 1 means participants 
showed a bias towards a truth judgment, and a value less than 1 means that participants 
showed a bias towards a judgment that the interviewee was lying.  
Table 1 shows the total number of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections 
obtained for the offender group and the non-offender group. A hit is a lie that is correctly 
identified as a lie, a miss is a lie which is incorrectly identified as a truth, a false alarm is a 
truth that is incorrectly identified as a lie and a correct rejection is a truth that is correctly 
identified as a truth.  Using these figures, d’ and β could be calculated for each participant.   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
An independent samples t-test was conducted with Offender Status (offender vs. non-
offender) as the independent variable and d’ as the dependent variable. Young offenders were 
significantly better at distinguishing lies from truths (M = .831, SD = .850), than young non-
offenders (M = .016, SD = .783), t(50) = 3.375, p = .001, d = .997.   
In a second level of analysis, d’ values were compared to 0 (no ability to differentiate 
between truths and lies) using one-sample t tests.  The mean d’ value for offenders was 
significantly greater than 0, t(15) = 3.910, p = .001, d = 2.02; whereas the mean d’ value for 
non-offenders was not significantly greater than 0, t(35) = .122, p = .904. All these results 
and that of the MANOVA above lend support to Hypothesis 1 that teenage offenders would 
be significantly better able to discriminate between truth tellers and liars than teenage non-
offenders. 
An independent samples t-test was conducted with Offender Status (offender vs. non-
offender) as the independent variable and β as the dependent variable. There was no 
significant difference between offenders (M = 1.102, SD = .327) and non-offenders (M = 
1.038, SD = .208) in terms of response bias, t(46) = .815, p = .419.  
TEENAGE OFFENDERS’ ABILITY TO DETECT DECEPTION IN THEIR PEERS 
 
14 
Using one-sample t tests, β values for the offender and non-offender groups were 
compared to 1. A value of 1 means participants did not favour a particular response, >1 
means participants showed a truth bias and <1 means participants showed a lie bias.  The 
mean β value for offenders was not significantly less than 1, t(13) = 1.165, p = .265 and the 
mean β value for non-offenders was not significantly greater than 1, t(33) = 1.059, p = .297.  
Therefore no support was found for Hypothesis 2 that teenage non-offenders would exhibit a 
truth bias in their credibility judgments whereas teenage offenders would exhibit a lie bias in 
their credibility judgments. 
Valid cues to deception  
To determine whether the five behaviours (response latency, hand movements, foot 
movements, quantity of detail and eye contact) that had been rated by two independent 
evaluators, were predictive of actual truth status, a one-way ANOVA was conducted.  The 
independent variable was the truth status of the interviewees (Liars or Truth Tellers) and the 
duration of response latency, frequency of hand movements, frequency of foot movements, 
quantity of details and duration of eye contact were the dependent variables. Liars had 
significantly longer response latencies (M = 6.79, SD = 1.51, 95% CI [5.20, 8.37]), than truth 
tellers (M = 4.43, SD = 1.12, 95% CI [3.25, 5.60]), F (1, 10) = 9.44, p = .012, d = -1.77; liars 
had significantly fewer hand movements (M = 2.08, SD = 2.87, 95% CI [-929, 5.07]), than 
truth tellers (M = 8.58, SD = 4.64, 95% CI [3.71, 13.45]), F (1, 10) = 8.51, p = .015, d = 1.68; 
liars had significantly fewer foot movements (M = 4.33, SD = 3.15, 95% CI [1.02, 7.65]), 
than truth tellers (M = 15.17, SD = 11.63, 95% CI [2.97, 27.37]), F (1, 10) = 4.85, p = .015, d 
= 1.27 and liars provided significantly fewer details (M = 6.75, SD = 4.01, 95% CI [2.54, 
10.96]), than truth tellers (M = 13.33, SD = 4.78, 95% CI [8.32, 18.35]), F (1, 10) = 6.68, p = 
.027, d = 1.49. Liars showed longer eye contact (M = 37.19, SD = 5.20, 95% CI [31.73, 
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42.65]), than truth tellers (M = 35.26, SD = 3.32, 95% CI [31.74, 38.71]) but this was not 
significant, F (1, 10) = .610, p = .453.  
As a result of these findings, it was appropriate to analyse whether or not offenders, 
who were more accurate in their credibility judgments than their non-offending counterparts, 
had used valid cues to make their decisions more often than the non-offenders. 
Believed cues to deception 
All participants were invited to indicate, via an unstructured free report, which 
behavioural cues they used when making their decisions about veracity.  Decisions were split 
into accurate and inaccurate decisions.  That is, whether or not an interviewee was correctly 
classified as a truth teller or a liar.  Researchers then analysed each free report and 
categorised as present, or absent, the four behaviours that had been found, for this sample, to 
be indicative of deceptive behaviour.  That is, participants’ responses were coded for the 
mention of response latency, hand movements, foot movements and the quantity of detail 
given by interviewees.  Although there were no significant differences in the amount of eye 
contact for truthful and lying interviewees, this cue was also coded to see if we could 
replicate the findings of previous research that suggests this is a popular believed cue to 
deceit.  
No participants stated that they had used foot movements to help them make their 
credibility decisions. Interestingly, both Offenders and Non-Offenders cited eye contact as 
the most frequently used cue within the subset of cues that were coded. This was the case 
regardless of whether the participants had made accurate or inaccurate decisions about the 
credibility of the interviewees.  Table 2 illustrates the number of times response latency, hand 
movements, foot movements, quantity of detail and eye contact were mentioned by 
participants as a function of whether or not they made an accurate credibility judgment or not. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
To test Hypothesis 3, that teenage Offenders would be more likely than Non-
Offenders to use valid cues to make accurate credibility judgments, a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted.  Only the behaviours noted for accurate judgments were included in the analysis. 
The independent variable was the Offender Status of the participants and mentions of 
duration of response latency and frequency of hand movements were the dependent variables.  
As mentioned above, no participants mentioned foot movements so this was not included in 
the analysis. Furthermore, quantity of detail was only mentioned for inaccurate decisions so 
this was not included in the analysis. Finally, mentions of eye contact were not included 
because, although participants often mentioned them, they are not actually valid cues to 
deception for this sample of interviewees.   
When making accurate decisions, Offenders cited longer response latencies 
significantly less often (M = 0.53, SD = 0.26, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09]), than non-offenders (M = 
0.12, SD = 0.32, 95% CI [0.07, 0.16]), F (1, 334) = 3.89, p = .049, d = -0.21. For accurate 
decisions, offenders cited fewer hand movements (M = 0.03, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [0.00, 0.06]), 
less often than non-offenders (M = 0.07, SD = 0.26, 95% CI [0.04, 0.11]), but this was not 
significant, F (1, 334) = 2.73, p = .099. Therefore, no support was found for Hypothesis 3 
that young offenders would be more likely than non-offenders to use valid cues to make 
accurate credibility judgments.  In fact the opposite was true.  Non-offenders, more so than 
offenders, were more likely to mention valid cues to deception when they made accurate 
credibility judgments.  
Discussion 
Before the current study, no investigation into the lie detection capabilities of teenage 
offenders had been conducted. The current study furthers the research into criminal lie-
detection accuracy and attempts to make a link between behavioural cues that are actually 
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discriminatory and those that are used by observers. The current study highlights above 
average lie-detection skills in teenage offenders who outshone their non-offending 
counterparts. 
Deception detection accuracy: Offenders vs. non-offenders 
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, teenage offenders showed a significantly higher overall 
accuracy rate for veracity than teenage non-offenders. They identified 60% of truths and 73% 
of lies, with an overall accuracy rate of 67%. Both their identification of truths and lies were 
significantly better than chance. In comparison, the non-offenders achieved similar hit rates 
for truths and lies and an overall accuracy rate of only 50% which was not significantly better 
than chance. The current findings differ from those of Hartwig et al. (2004) who found no 
significant difference between the overall lie detection accuracy of student participants and 
prison inmates.  
This, in part, may be explained by the feedback hypothesis. The teenage offenders in 
the current study exhibited good deception detection abilities and this may be due to their 
experience within a deceptive criminal environment. Our teenage offenders may have 
developed self-preservation strategies (Hartwig et al., 2004) during investigative interviews 
with police officers and during interactions with their contemporaries. That is, they may have 
been able to see which of their own deceptive strategies were successful leading them to be 
better able to judge the credibility of others. This supports the idea of a wider understanding 
of deception (Granhag et al., 2004).  
Truth and lie biases 
The current findings differ from previous research (e.g., Levine et al., 1999; Porter, 
ten Brinke, & Gustaw, 2010) in that no truth bias was found for the teenage non-offenders.  
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Furthermore, no bias (truth or lie) was found for the teenage offenders and therefore 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Whilst the general findings are that individuals are more 
likely to have a truth bias due to predominant exposure to truthful discourse (Vrij, 2008), the 
current findings propose that there is no truth or lie bias for either non-offenders or young 
offenders. This suggests that the ‘veracity effect’ (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), which implies 
that individuals tend to have a higher ability to detect truths over lies, may not develop until 
adulthood. Furthermore, the teenage offenders in the current study did not have a pronounced 
lie bias as per the findings of Hartwig et al. (2004). Whilst Hartwig et al, (2004) did not find 
offenders to be better at detecting deception than non-offenders overall, they did have a 
particularly high ability to detect lies (88.5%). This indicates that in the current study, the 
teenage offenders’ inflated ability to detect deception might have been due to the fact that 
they did not exhibit a truth or lie bias. 
Cues to deception  
We found that liars exhibited significantly longer response latencies than truth tellers. 
Vrij’s (2008) review suggested that liars, compared to truth tellers do tend to wait for longer 
before starting their answers to questions (e.g., Farrow et al., 2003; Gregg, 2007; Johnson Jr., 
Barnhardt & Zhu, 2003; Langleben et al., 2005). We also found that liars exhibited 
significantly fewer hand movements, and significantly fewer foot movements than truth 
tellers again supporting Vrij’s (2008) review of the literature.  In the current research, liars 
provided significantly fewer details than truth tellers. This is in line with the findings of 
DePaulo et al. (2003), Granhag, Vrij and Verschuere (2014) and Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip 
and Yoo, (2014) who suggest that with the increased cognitive effort of deception, liars are 
less likely to be able to provide as many details as truth tellers. 
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Hypothesis 3 suggested that young offenders’ enhanced ability to detect deceit may be 
as a result of, not only receiving more feedback, but also using valid cues to deception rather 
than invalid cues. Interestingly, the current study suggested that offenders do not make more 
accurate judgments using valid cues. The cue predominantly cited, by offenders and non-
offenders, for accurate decisions, eye-related behaviours, was not actually a behaviour that 
significantly discriminated our truth tellers from our liars. This supports the findings of 
Granhag et al. (2004), who found that both students and prison inmates held stereotypical and 
inaccurate beliefs about cues indicative of lying. Elaad (2009) also found that criminals held 
stereotypical beliefs regarding cues to deception.   However, it does not support Vrij and 
Semin (1996) who found that prisoners had more accurate beliefs regarding valid cue usage 
in lie detection. It is evident from the current findings that invalid cues to deception were 
used by offenders when making some of their accurate credibility judgments.  In sum, no 
clear picture has emerged in terms of the behavioural cues used to make accurate and 
inaccurate credibility judgments.  It seems that those who make more correct judgments are 
not necessarily using useful cues. 
Perhaps some explanation lies within an intuitive approach to the detection of 
deception (Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  It is likely that some of the skill individuals use to detect 
deceptive statements is a result of higher cognitive processes that are complex to evaluate and 
measure. Moreover, verbal explanations elicited from research participants are never able to 
fully represent complex mental processes due to a lack of introspective access (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977).  It is, therefore, hard to be confident that the cues our participants were 
reporting were representative of their decision-making strategies. The fact that the teenage 
offenders in the current study were able to detect ‘lies’ at a rate of 73% but appeared to use 
very few valid cues to deceit indicates that there were other processes involved, which may 
be “partially implicit and automatic” (Hartwig & Bond, 2011, pg. 644). What is interesting in 
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the context of the current study is that Hartwig and Bond (2011) discuss intuitiveness as a 
result of a lifetime of experience (of predominantly truthful discourse). However, our 
relatively young offenders had an average age of 15 years. This suggests that a criminal 
environment may somehow compensate for a lifetime of experience.  
The Brunswikian Lens Model allows for a theoretical understanding of people’s 
deception detection abilities (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). This Model incorporates a) the 
predictability of interviewees’ deceptiveness based on their actual behaviour, b) the 
predictability of the interviewees’ perceived deceptiveness, and c) the matching of cue-based 
predictions of actual deceptiveness with cue-based predictions of apparent deceptiveness. 
This iterates the notion of an interplay of factors that may be too complex to be analysed with 
a simple ‘observe and report’ method, commonly central to lie detection research (including 
the current study). Whilst the current data has not been analysed with the Brunswikian Lens 
Model approach, this is a suggestion for future research to investigate the multifaceted 
processes of  lie detection in a teenage sample.  Teenage lies and truths remain an 
understudied domain in terms of verbal and nonverbal behavioural cues.  
Limitations of the current study included the unequal sample sizes for each condition 
(as it was difficult to recruit the young offender sample) and the relatively small sample sizes. 
During analysis, steps were taken to make sure that the correct statistical assumptions were 
made due to the small and unequal sample sizes, but further research should explore whether 
the findings remain the same even when more young offenders, and more equal samples 
sizes, are recruited. Our non-offender sample comprised an unequal sex ratio of 33% males 
and 67% females. However, previous findings show no gender differences when it comes to 
detecting deception (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). 
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Vrij and Granhag (2012) discuss their reservations with the use of video clips within 
deception research due to their lack of relativity to the way in which investigators actually 
assess deception. They argue that investigators should concentrate on the active processes 
used when making veracity judgments rather than relying on passive observation. ten Brinke 
and Porter (2012) argue that whilst visual cues to deception are, in part, overshadowed by the 
encouraged development of more diagnostic verbal cues (Vrij and Granhag, 2012), the use of 
numerous visual cues can be beneficial if used by an informed investigator. Within the 
current study, the experiences of the young offenders may act as a catalyst for such 
‘informed’ knowledge leading to more pronounced deception detection abilities. This may 
therefore form a basis for the development of understanding into the ‘process’ of deception 
detection within teenage offenders. 
Motivation in laboratory studies is a controversial subject. However, it is assumed that 
the same theoretical principles apply regardless of whether motivation is high or low, because 
the mechanisms used to detect deceit remain the same. The liars in the current study told low-
stake lies; that is there was little to no consequence of the interviewee not convincing the 
interviewer of their truthfulness. It is generally noted that high-stake lies are in fact easier to 
detect than low stake lies (Lane & DePaulo, 1999; Vrij, 2000; Vrij, Harden, Terry, Edward, 
& Bull, 2001) and that liars who have high motivation are easier to detect than those with low 
motivation (DePaulo, Blank, Swaim, & Hairfield, 1992). In essence, this may mean that lie 
detection in laboratory situations is harder than in field studies.  
In summary, the current study revealed a high lie detection accuracy score for the 
sample of young offenders with no accompanying lie or truth bias. The findings suggest that 
it may be the criminal environment that facilitates the development of lie-detection ability 
before custodial sentences are served. Exactly what it is that aids this ability is questionable 
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and whilst feedback from everyday interactions provides one possible explanation, more 
research should further investigate this finding, by integrating concepts from more 
computational approaches, such as those proposed by Hartwig and Bond (2011).  
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Table 1. Total frequency of hits, misses, false alarms, correct rejections for offenders and 
non-offenders. 
 Hit Miss False Alarm Correct 
Rejection 
Total 
Offenders 69 27 38 58 192 
Non-offenders 110 106 111 105 432 












































Response latency 5.3% 3.3% 11.7% 6.9% 
Hand movements 3.1% 4.9% 7.3% 7.9% 
Foot movements 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Quantity of details 0% 1.6% 0% 1% 
Eye contact 10.7% 13.1% 16.5% 19.7% 




















Appendix 1: Interview questions 
1. Do you have the ipod in your possession? 
2. Are you telling the truth? 
3. Tell me exactly what you do have in your possession.  
4. You forgot to mention the ipod didn’t you? 
5. Are you telling me that you do not have the ipod in your possession? 
6. Are you absolutely sure that you are telling me the truth? 
7. So to make sure we have this absolutely clear, you are 100% sure that you do not have 
the ipod in your pockets somewhere? 
8. Just recap for me one more time, what do you have in your pockets at the moment? 
 
